Category Archives: WLS

WLS 3.3 Released

New

  • Burn folder support for FileMonitor
  • FileData
    • Log file metadata for files found in command line parameters and event logs
  • Fixed (non-removable) disk monitoring
  • Load balancing
  • Network location awareness by joined domain
  • Optional host name set by DNS resolution
  • Optional alternate static host name
  • Monitoring UDF optical media changes
  • Support for non-FIPS hashing algorithms when FIPS mode is enabled
  • Suspended process checking (potential process hollowing)

Changes

  • Command line string handling
  • Database quota handling and maintenance
  • Error reporting
  • Event log extra data parsing
  • Event log XML parser
  • Installer
  • Network adapter reporting
  • New event log provider string resources (dynamic loading)
  • NewHash checking accuracy
  • Optimized syslog string generation
  • SessionMonitor reporting
    • All available session data logged for each session change event
    • Source IP address, optional source name (by resolution)
  • SQLite driver update
  • WMI reporting
    • Array handling
    • Nested WMI object support
    • Result count and index

Fixes

  • Database over quota issues
  • Drive monitor errors for unsupported file systems (HFS+, etc.)
  • Event log subsystem error detection
  • Potential WTS memory leak

For more information on WLS, click “WLS Information” at the top, or here: WLS Information

If you’d like additional information about WLS, send me a note via the contact form. WLS is currently available to US entities, but does require a signed license agreement.

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WLS 3.2 – new process creation data: ConsoleProcessId, SessionId, WindowStation

WLS 3.2 introduces a few new pieces of data for process creation events.

ConsoleProcessId

A process can define an associated console process. The value, if provided by the process, is logged.

[host] Security: LogType=”WLS”, BaseFileName=”cmd.exe”, Channel=”Security”, CommandLine=”‘C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe'”, CompanyName=”Microsoft Corporation”, Computer=”[host].[domain]”, ConsoleProcessId=”0xd08″, CreatorProcessName=”explorer”, EventID=”4688″, EventRecordID=”13010758″, ExecutionProcessID=”4″, ExecutionThreadID=”64″, FileDescription=”Windows Command Processor”, FileVersion=”6.1.7601.17514 (win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850)”, InternalName=”cmd”, Keywords=”0x8020000000000000″, Language=”English (United States)”, Length=”345088″, Level=”0″, MD5=”5746BD7E255DD6A8AFA06F7C42C1BA41″, NewProcessId=”0x1250″, NewProcessName=”C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe”, Opcode=”0″, ProcessId=”0x15a4″, ProductVersion=”6.1.7601.17514″, ProviderGuid=”{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}”, ProviderName=”Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing”, SessionId=”2″, SHA1=”0F3C4FF28F354AEDE202D54E9D1C5529A3BF87D8″, Signed=”Catalog”, SSDeep=”6144:NVl7yDR2iaGcsVXFBM6IT77aVebJWC1jIdDWCoCX9Sm:jdyDRwpmFq6ITSebJWwjIdDbNS”, SubjectDomainName=”[domain]”, SubjectLogonId=”0x940ee”, SubjectUserName=”[user]”, SubjectUserSid=”[SID]”, Task=”13312″, TokenElevationType=”TokenElevationTypeDefault (1)”, ValidSignatureDate=”False”, Version=”0″, WindowStation=”Winsta0\Default”, Zone=”0″

[host] Security: LogType=”WLS”, BaseFileName=”conhost.exe”, Cached=”True”, Channel=”Security”, CommandLine=”\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe ‘-1619064235-21228482731568564810739129054211757705058345892-390116831-1302099848#000″, CompanyName=”Microsoft Corporation”, Computer=”[host].[domain]”, CreatorProcessName=”csrss”, EventID=”4688″, EventRecordID=”13010759″, ExecutionProcessID=”4″, ExecutionThreadID=”64″, FileDescription=”Console Window Host”, FileVersion=”6.1.7600.16385 (win7_rtm.090713-1255)”, InternalName=”ConHost”, Keywords=”0x8020000000000000″, Language=”English (United States)”, Length=”338432″, Level=”0″, MD5=”BF95EA5809E3BBF55370F7CB309FEBD0″, NewProcessId=”0xd08″, NewProcessName=”C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe”, Opcode=”0″, ProcessId=”0x1194″, ProductVersion=”6.1.7600.16385″, ProviderGuid=”{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}”, ProviderName=”Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing”, SessionId=”2″, SHA1=”1BD846AA22B1D63A1F900F6D08D8BFA8082AE4DB”, Signed=”Catalog”, SSDeep=”6144:MvAVUtrTB1pzQdTOKnJoWafxXyn1U+8kbYzwFH1mbRBlOxm:MaaTpzSLSffxXyp8kb5ElY”, SubjectDomainName=”[domain]”, SubjectLogonId=”0x3e7″, SubjectUserName=”[host]$”, SubjectUserSid=”S-1-5-18″, Task=”13312″, TokenElevationType=”TokenElevationTypeDefault (1)”, ValidSignatureDate=”False”, Version=”0″, WindowStation=”Winsta0\Default”, Zone=”0″

SessionId

Previous versions of WLS provided data in regards to session information which could be correlated with the environmental variable SESSIONNAME, but was a bit awkward when viewing child processes that carry forward these variables even when the session has changed. SessionId is now reported for each process and can positively correlate to the correct session, without worrying about inherited environmental variables.

WindowStation

WindowStation is now reported for each process, providing insight into how the process was executed. WinSta0 can display a user interface and can receive user input. Other window stations are non-interactive, and can be used to enforce security restrictions, such as providing a sandboxed environment.

Chrome, for example, makes use of other window stations:

[host] Security: LogType=”WLS”, BaseFileName=”chrome.exe”, Cached=”True”, Channel=”Security”, CLIENTNAME=”[remote_host]”, CommandLine=”‘C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe’ –type=renderer –lang=en-US –force-fieldtrials=’BrowserBlacklist/Enabled/ChromeSuggestions/Most Likely with Kodachrome/EmbeddedSearch/Group6 pct:10f stable:pp2 prefetch_results:1 reuse_instant_search_base_page:1/ExtensionInstallVerification/Enforce/GoogleNow/Enable/OmniboxBundledExperimentV1/StandardR4/Prerender/PrerenderEnabled/PrerenderLocalPredictorSpec/LocalPredictor=Disabled/QUIC/Disabled/SafeBrowsingIncidentReportingService/Default/ShowAppLauncherPromo/ShowPromoUntilDismissed/Test0PercentDefault/group_01/UMA-Dynamic-Binary-Uniformity-Trial/default/UMA-Dynamic-Uniformity-Trial/Group6/UMA-Population-Restrict/normal/UMA-Session-Randomized-Uniformity-Trial-5-Percent/group_10/UMA-Uniformity-Trial-1-Percent/group_06/UMA-Uniformity-Trial-10-Percent/group_08/UMA-Uniformity-Trial-100-Percent/group_01/UMA-Uniformity-Trial-20-Percent/group_03/UMA-Uniformity-Trial-5-Percent/group_12/UMA-Uniformity-Trial-50-Percent/group_01/VoiceTrigger/Install/’ –extension-process –renderer-print-preview –device-scale-factor=1 –enable-threaded-compositing –enable-delegated-renderer –channel=’616.4.232552611\176135091′ /prefetch:673131151″, CompanyName=”Google Inc.”, Computer=”[host].[domain]”, CreatorProcessName=”chrome”, EventID=”4688″, EventRecordID=”13010449″, ExecutionProcessID=”4″, ExecutionThreadID=”64″, FileDescription=”Google Chrome”, FileVersion=”37.0.2062.103″, InternalName=”chrome_exe”, Keywords=”0x8020000000000000″, Language=”English (United States)”, Length=”852808″, Level=”0″, MD5=”0706DDBD4EA0D122CA069FF2552E20FD”, NewProcessId=”0x1d84″, NewProcessName=”C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe”, Opcode=”0″, ProcessId=”0x268″, ProductVersion=”37.0.2062.103″, ProviderGuid=”{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}”, ProviderName=”Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing”, SessionId=”2″, SESSIONNAME=”RDP-Tcp#0″, SHA1=”627A52C64711BE8132E1D32FD482178E7422CF4F”, Signed=”True”, SSDeep=”12288:59obX26I5VZVX5LTqLEOtPf5R/38i//lIaJJ7XtvKiI245OtCYQpl/ARG4KHFBnk:59GLtXtTRolaKlBnk”, SubjectDomainName=”[domain]”, SubjectLogonId=”0x940ee”, SubjectUserName=”[user]”, SubjectUserSid=”[SID]”, Task=”13312″, TokenElevationType=”TokenElevationTypeDefault (1)”, ValidSignatureDate=”True”, Version=”0″, WindowStation=”Service-0x0-940ee$\sbox_alternate_desktop_0x268″, Zone=”0″

MSDN – Window Stations


For more information on WLS, click “WLS Information” at the top, or here: WLS Information

If you’d like additional information about WLS, send me a note via the contact form. WLS is currently available to US entities, but does require a signed license agreement.

WLS 3.2 Released

Performance

  • Replaced WMI calls with native API calls where applicable
  • Faster database maintenance procedures

Features

  • CPU utilization tracking and reporting
  • New process metadata
    • ConsoleProcessId
    • SessionId
    • WindowStation

Fixes

  • Disconnected client resource utilization
  • Additional handling of SEHExceptions
  • Errors for EventRecordIDs > int32.Max

For more information on WLS, click “WLS Information” at the top, or here: WLS Information

If you’d like additional information about WLS, send me a note via the contact form. WLS is currently available to US entities, but does require a signed license agreement.

WLS 3.1 Released

Performance

  • Over 10x increase in internal throughput
  • Reduced internal latency
  • Improved read/write concurrency
  • Reduced I/O writes

Features

  • Advanced log filtering
  • Detailed statistic logs of log filter matches
  • Certificate monitoring enhanced – all stores now available
  • Configuration hashing – ensure hosts are running the correct configuration
  • Enhanced CommandMonitor – Faster memory searches, includes process name, support for cmd, powershell, and more!
  • Detailed network interface logs on start-up and network change
  • Display names for coded values
  • ETL monitoring for Event Logs and files
  • Per server bandwidth and maximum log length settings
  • Full SSL connection details logged on first connection
  • Input rate limiting – prevent unexpected log floods
  • PrivateMBLimit – prevent WLS from consuming resources on a troubled system
  • SSDeep hashing
  • SessionMonitor – now includes all remote session details for RemoteConnect
  • User SID resolution to user name when present in log
  • Versioning changed – Major.Minor.[Year][DayOfYear].[MinuteOfDay]
  • Registry and file locations now restricted to Local System and Administrators

For more information on WLS, click “WLS Information” at the top, or here: WLS Information

If you’d like additional information about WLS, send me a note via the contact form. WLS is currently available to US entities, but does require a signed license agreement.

Finding vulnerable OpenSSL DLLs (Heartbleed) with WLS and Splunk

If you are running WLS with ModuleMonitor enabled, you already have logs of all loaded DLLs.

Simply run the following search:

WLS_ModuleMonitor “openssl” FileVersion=”1.0.1*” NOT FileVersion=”1.0.1g”

Results will look similar to:

2014-04-24T11:28:38-05:00 [host] WLS_ModuleMonitor: LogType=”WindowsEventLog”, BaseFileName=”ssleay32.dll”, ChangeType=”Added”, CompanyName=”The OpenSSL Project, http://www.openssl.org/”, FileDescription=”OpenSSL Shared Library”, FileName=”C:\Program Files\MakerBot\MakerWare\ssleay32.dll”, FileVersion=”1.0.1e”, InternalName=”ssleay32″, Language=”English (United States)”, Length=”343040″, MD5=”A49B52FB216AD1524C902A41A433A1E1″, Process=”makerware”, ProductVersion=”1.0.1e”, SHA1=”F21CBCC5F291C1D841581FDBBBF854B315D71248″, WLSKey=”35505″, Zone=”0″


For more information on WLS, click “WLS Information” at the top, or here: WLS Information

If you’d like additional information about WLS, send me a note via the contact form. WLS is currently available to US entities, but does require a signed license agreement.